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THE IMPUTED NEGOTIABILITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS
UNDER THE CODE
ANTONIO R. BAUTISTAI and FRANK R. KENNEDYt
The maximization of commercial activity in our economy has ac-
cented the demand for greater predictability in the law of commercial
transactions. Responding to this demand, the sponsors of the Uniform
Commercial Code have set out, among other things, "to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions."' The Code
is thus the product of an unprecedented effort in a common law jurisdic-
tion to integrate a mass of related statutory and decisional rules covering
a wide range of mercantile dealings. Although the Code does not com-
prehend all areas of commercial law, and its future extension into other
areas is a recognized possibility,2 it is, nevertheless, manifest from the
pattern of the Code, especially from its careful definitions and cross
references between interrelating sections, that the statute is meant to be
a coherent whole.' In view of the magnitude of the Code, the full im-
t Member of the Philippine Bar.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. UNIFORM CO MERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2) (a). References to the Code are, unless
otherwise indicated, to the 1958 Official Text with Comments, as adopted by the Ameri-
can Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
2. Although the Uniform Commercial Code, unlike its counterparts in the civil
law orbit, does not cover an area defined, analytically or functionally, by a
clearly recognizable overall principle, its coverage can be defended on the prag-
matic grounds that the individual Articles involve either subjects presently
covered by somewhat obsolete uniform acts, or related subjects, such as secured
transactions, as to which uniformity and improvement of the present law ap-
pear desirable. Future extension of the Code into other areas of commercial
law is not hereby precluded.
1955 N.Y. LAW REVSiONi Comfm'N ReP. vol. 1, at 125.
3. The "Official Comments" were, according to the Code's sponsors, partly in-
tended "to aid in viewing the Act as an integrated whole." The sponsors explained
further:
This Act purports to deal with all the phases which may ordinarily arise
in the handling of a commercial transaction, from start to finish.
Because of the close relationship of each phase of a complete transaction
to every other phase, it is believed that each Article of this Act is cognate to
the single broad subject "Commercial Transactions," and that this Act is valid
under any constitutional provision requiring an act to deal with only one subject.
Comment to Uniform Commercial Code Title. The Code has been aptly described as
[a] comprehensive project in that it attempts to correlate several bodies of
existing law, organizing them in one statute so that their parallels and variations
and their impact on each other can be grasped. Important parts of the Code
are concerned with defining the spheres of the several bodies of law, clarifying
their interaction and resolving conflicts.
1956 N.Y. L.kw REViSION CoMM'N REP. 21.
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plications of its provisions can hardly be grasped even by those most
familiar with them, including the draftsmen and sponsors,4 and ac-
cordingly some interstices and conflicts among its provisions are bound
to appear in the course of its application. Orderliness, selectivity and
comprehensiveness being fundamental problems in any codification,'
evaluation of the merit of a code must be founded on an assessment of
the draftsmen's success in coping with these problems.
With the exceptions of articles 1 and 10, which respectively contain
general provisions and provisions for an effective date and repealer,
each of the Code's articles is devoted to a particular corpus of commercial
law. As a part of the task of integration, the Code draftsmen have de-
lineated and clarified the interaction of rules stated in each of the articles.6
This paper, concerning itself with a search for a definition of the rela-
tionship between a negotiable note and a security interest, will survey
first the state of the law outside the Code and then look to the Code for
illumination. The inquiry will include an evaluation of the impact upon
each other of the rules laid down for perfecting security interests in
personal property and the rules governing negotiable notes. The former
4. Even during the formative years of the Code, one of those who collaborated on
it had expressed awe at its expansiveness and complexity: "With all the good will and
industry in the world, it will be years before the bench and bar have mastered the in-
tricacies and explored the implications of so massive a statute." Gilmore, On the Dif-
ficulties of Codifying Comnniercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 1356 (1948). The far-
reaching and subtle impact of the Code on a substantial amount of existing statutory
and decisional law has also been noted with some concern as to the consequent task put
thereby on the lawyer.
It [the Code] would also modify the operation of many statutes of general
application, such as the statute of frauds, statutes of limitation, procedural
statutes or statutes limiting common law doctrines like the requirement of con-
sideration for contracts, or the privilege of infants to disaffirm their contracts.
Even where it does not purport to govern the question, the Code assumes and
relies for amplification much law outside its own provisions, including the entire
body of the law of contracts, agency, and equity, and much of the law of surety-
ship, insolvency, evidence and procedure. Relatively few lawyers are, through
their own experience and practice, expert in all of this law as it relates to
even two or three of the topics dealt with in the Code. An even smaller num-
ber are sufficiently expert in all of this law as applied to the entire subject
matter of the Code to appraise, from their own experience, the interaction of
the several parts of the Code and its total effect on the law.
1955 N.Y. LAW REvIsIoN CoMm'N REP. vol. 1, at 17. The abundance of interpretative,
clarificatory and supplementary official comments appended by the sponsors to the
sections of the Code has led observers to say that "the Code as elaborated by the Com-
ments resembles a text book of the law." Id. at 22.
Professors Patterson and Schlesinzer. writing on "Problems of Codification of
Commercial Law" for the New York Law Revision Commission in connection with the
latter's study of the Code, state "five principal characteristics" of a "code": "Orderly,
authoritative (i.e., enacted as legislation), selective (i.e., only the leading rules), com-
prehensive (i.e., all of the leading rules) and unified (i.e., on a single subject matter)."
1955 N.Y. LAw REvIsIoN CoImmiI'N REP. vol. 1, at 37.
6. 1956 N.Y. LAW REVISION Cosmm'N REP. 31.
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are contained in article 9 of the Code, which sets out "a comprehensive
scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and
fixtures" ;' the latter are in article 3 of the Code, which comprehends the
rules for what are traditionally regarded as commercial paper-drafts,
checks, certificates of deposit and notes-and which is intended to be
"a complete revision and modernization of the Uniform Negotiable In-
struments Law."9
I. THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE
Of the promissory note it has been said that "it became the vehicle
for the nineteenth century transformation of the American economy
both from a cash to a credit basis and from an unsecured to a secured
basis."1  As is confirmed by the Code itself,"' negotiable notes and se-
curity agreements are persistently used to cover one and the same credit
transaction. 2 Sales finance companies have exploited this medium of
credit selling by combining a conditional sale contract and a negotiable
note." Chattel security is a recognized fellow-traveler 4 of the negotiable
note.
Our problem, which derives from the interrelationship between the
negotiable note and its accompanying security, arises when the note has
been negotiated to a holder in due course'5 who then seeks to enforce the
security. By statutory fiat, a negotiable note is enforceable by a holder
7. Comment to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101.
8. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-104 and comment 1 to UNIFOR. COIMMER-
CIAL CODE § 3-103.
9. Comment to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-101.
10. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1070 (1954).
11. See comment 4 to UNIFORM COMMmCIAL CODE § 9-105 and comment 1 to UNI-
FORM COMERCIAL CODE § 9-308.
12. This of course excludes from consideration in this paper credit in the form of
negotiable notes secured by realty, or credit in the form of negotiable bonds, however
secured.
13. See PLUMMER & YOUNG, SALES FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRAC-
TICES 9-10, 104-05, 117-18 (1940) ; Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail In-
stallinent Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 940 (1959). See generally Ayres, Installment Selling
and Finance Companies, 196 Annals 121 (1938). The same situation exists in Canada.
See Comment, 40 CAN. B. REV. 461 (1962). For a statement that banks and finance
companies resort to this medium so generally, in financing the retail sales of new and
used automobiles, that the courts may take judicial notice of the practice, see Dart Nat'l
Bank v. Mid-States Corp., 356 Mich. 574, 583, 97 N.W.2d 98, 104 (1959).
14. See Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1081.
15. As to who may be a holder in due course, see UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW § 52 and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302. For a comparison of these
two sections, see Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code,
49 Nw. U.L. Rav. 417 (1954). It should be noted that § 3-302 in the 1958 Official Text
of the Code is slightly revised from that version of this section discussed in Professor
Britton's article.
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in due course" or a transferee from such holder"7 notwithstanding cer-
tain claims and defenses." And by the doctrine of overwhelmingly pre-
vailing pre-Code decisions, this quality of negotiability, or at least some
aspects of it,'" may be regarded as having been "imputed" or "imparted"
to the accompanying security so that it shares the note's enforceability
despite claims and defenses.2" The question of the extent to which the
security interest acquires by imputation the note's attributes of negoti-
ability may assume special relevance in the event of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy. This paper addresses itself to a consideration of this question
with special attention to its implications in bankruptcy.
A bankruptcy-oriented approach to a consideration of the enforce-
ability of a security instrument is never difficult to justify. The bank-
ruptcy of a borrower or buyer on credit is not often contemplated as a
probability or even serious possibility by a creditor, but a creditor who
insists on security without checking its validity should the debtor's bank-
ruptcy eventuate is no more farsighted than the sailor who insists on hav-
ing lifesaving gear aboard without checking its watertightness before
putting to sea. The impact of bankruptcy on security interests is now so
well recognized that it comes close to a platitude to say that the supreme
test of the worth of a security is bankruptcy.
Even a security interest which has been perfected' against all of the
16. The rights of a holder in due course are generally stated in NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAW § 57 (but see also §§ 15 & 16) and in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
3-305.
17. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 58, last sentence; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-201.
18. The claims and defenses from which a holder in due course is insulated are
generally stated in the statutory sections cited in note 16, supra. See Britton, Defenses,
Claims of Omership and Equities-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law With Corresponding Provisions of Article 3 of the Proposed Commer-
cial Code, 7 HASTINGS L. J. 1 (1955).
19. For an analytical catalogue of the principal attributes of negotiability, see Gil-
more, supra note 10, at 1063-66.
20. See notes 27 and 28 infra and their accompanying texts.
21. "The security concept of 'perfection' . . . is a relative concept, roughly equiva-
lent to the notion of 'protection.' Just as a person may be protected against one evil
while exposed to another, a security interest may be perfected against certain claims
and vulnerable to others." BOGERT, BRITTON & HAWKLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF SALES AND SECURITY 435 (4th ed. 1962). The term "perfected" is used in
§§ 3, 60a, 67b and 67d(5) of the Bankruptcy Act [Citations to Title 11 of the United
States Code are omitted herein]. The test of perfection of a transfer in bankruptcy is
made to depend almost wholly on state law. See, e.g., 3 COLLIER, BANICRUPTCy 913-16
(14th ed. 1950) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER with the date of publication of the ma-
terial cited]. Article 9 of the Code is supposed to use the term "perfected" in the sense
that this term is used in § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act:
As in Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, the term "perfected" is used to de-
scribe a security interest in personal property which cannot be defeated in
insolvency proceedings or in general by creditors. A security interest is "per-
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bankrupt's creditors is not thereby rendered impregnable to the trustee's
powers of avoidance.2 A fortiori, a security interest which has not been
perfected against some or all of the bankrupt's creditors is a riskier se-
curity still. A security interest's unperfected status may render it vul-
nerable to attack by the trustee in bankruptcy as a preference under Sec-
tion 60, a fraudulent transfer under section 67d or as a transfer voidable
under either the "strong-arm clause" of section 70c or the power of
avoidance given by section 70e.
Under section 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, a transfer which has
not been perfected at the time of bankruptcy "shall be deemed to have
been made immediately before the filing of the petition," so that the
security transfer is considered to have been made or suffered within four
months before the filing of the petition, thereby establishing one of the
elements of a voidable bankruptcy preference. A parallel situation is that
of an unperfected fraudulent transfer under section 67d of the Act.
23
Under the "strong-arm clause" of section 70c, if, as to any property of
the bankrupt, a creditor "could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable
proceedings at the date of bankruptcy," the trustee is "vested as of such
date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding
a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually
exists." And, by section 70e, the trustee is empowered to avoid any
fected" when the secured party has taken whatever steps are necessary to give
him such an interest.
Comment 1 to UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301. It has been explained that "perfec-
tion" is "a Code term of art which describes the rights a secured party has in collateral
and regulates those rights as they may come into contact or conflict with the rights of
third persons, such as buyers from or judgment creditors of, the debtor." SPIvAcK, SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 33 (1962). A disparity
between the Code and Bankruptcy Act sense of the term "perfected" is suggested by
Coogan, A Suggested Analytical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
63 COLUm. L. REv. 1, 25-27 (1963). Mr. Coogan urges that what is really meant by
"perfected" is to be gathered from a consideration of "the net effect of Sections 60 and
70c of the Bankruptcy Act," so that the term is to be correctly understood thus:
A transfer of personal property (at least personal property other than fix-
tures) is perfected upon the taking of whatever is the last of the steps re-
quired by state law to prevent a general creditor from thereafter obtaining by
legal or equitable proceedings a lien on the collateral that would -be superior to
the rights of the transferee.
Id. at 26.
22. Thus, security interests, though technically perfected, may be avoided as pre-
ferential transfers under § 60 or as fraudulent transfers under § 67d. Cf. Coogan,
supra note 21, at 26 n.77. But see H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1952),
which, in explaining the 1952 amendment to § 67d(5), points out that "a fraudulent
transfer can never 'become perfected' against creditors."
23. Section 67d(5), like § 60a(2), pertinently provides that if a "transfer is not so
far perfected prior to the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, it
shall be deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of such petition." The
making of the transfer within one year of the filing of the petition is one of the ele-
ments of a fraudulent transfer under § 67d.
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transfer or obligation which is "fraudulent as against or voidable for any
other reason by any creditor of the debtor, having a claim provable"
under the Act.
The problem proposed to be examined here may then be nailed down
to this: whether a security interest, not perfected against creditors of the
debtor and therefore voidable by the latter's trustee in bankruptcy, may
be immunized from attack by negotiation of the secured note to a holder
in due course. That is to say, can the negotiable note shield its accom-
panying security interest against attack in bankruptcy?
The problem may be illustrated thus: A executes a negotiable
promissory note to B and secures the note by a chattel mortgage. The
mortgage is not perfected against levying creditors of A. B indorses
the note, accompanied by the chattel mortgage,24 to C, who takes the note
as a holder in due course. A is subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt.
Can C enforce the chattel mortgage against A's trustee in bankruptcy?
Or, to frame the question within the context of our inquiry, does the
chattel mortgage's connection with the note serve to immunize it from
attack by the trustee in bankruptcy?
No pat answer is given by the reported cases to the question posed.
Surely the situation put is not an extraordinary one, and indeed there are
cases where, as the subsequent discussion will confirm, the question could
have been grappled with. Lack of appreciation by counsel of the in-
volvement of the question in their case, as well as the availability of more
obvious alternative theories on which to ground resolution of the chal-
lenge to the security interest, has undoubtedly contributed to the escape
of this problem from recognition. Most of the cases where the issue was
squarely presented and dealt with were concerned with real estate security
for negotiable notes. The relevance of real estate security precedents to
the present study 5 is not to be dismissed out of hand, since the question
24. Of course, as many of the cases in the textual discussion to come will affirm,
the negotiation of the note will carry with it the chattel mortgage, without any formal
assignment or delivery of the latter. See, e.g., OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 633 n.56 (1951).
25. But see Note, The Negotiable Character of Mortgages, 2 CENT. L.J. 501 (1875).
Compare 1955 N.Y. LAw REvlsION Comm'N REP. vol. 3, at 2014:
Since in many instances personal property security transactions involve small
amounts, where litigation is unprofitable, or, if the amounts are large, have on
one or both sides parties who are well-advised by counsel and who may in addi-
tion be governed by business practices requiring arbitration in other out-of-
court settlements, the actual authority in the application of equity rules to per-
sonal property security is meager. On the other hand, the decisions regarding
equity's authority in respect to real estate mortgages are relatively numerous.
A constant source of uncertainty to the security lawyer is the degree to which
real estate precedents are controlling when the subject-matter of security is a
chattel or intangible.
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of the proper interrelation between a note and its accompanying security
is, we submit, largely indifferent to whether the security is personal or
real property.
26
II. THE DOCTRINE OF "IMPUTED" NEGOTIABILITY:
CARPENTER V. LONGAN
Ever since the United States Supreme Court's decision in 1872 of
the case of Carpenter v. Longa, " the notion that a negotiable note im-
parts its character of negotiability to its accompanying security has held
steady sway.2" Carpenter z. Longan dealt with a promissory note se-
cured by a real estate mortgage. The payee had, before maturity of the
note, assigned29 for valuable consideration the note and mortgage to a
third party. The note not having been paid at maturity, the assignee sued
the debtor to foreclose the mortgage. The debtor defended by alleging
his delivery to the payee of certain wheat and flour, which the payee had
agreed to sell and to apply the proceeds thereof to the note. In awarding
full judgment to the assignee on the note and mortgage, the Court found
the presence of a negotiable note decisive of the assignee's right to
foreclose.
The question presented for our determination is, whether an
assignee, under the circumstances of this case, takes the mort-
gage as he takes the note, free from the objections to which it
was liable in the hands of the mortgagee. We hold the af firm-
ative. The contract as regards the note was that the maker
26. The view has been expressed that the doctrine of imputed negotiability ap-
plies to chattel mortgages but not to conditional sales. See Gilmore, The Commercial
Doctrine of Good Faith PFrchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1094 (1954) ; Gilmore & Axelrod,
Chattel Security: 1, 57 YALE L.. 517, 540-41, 543 (1948) ; Note, Negotiability of Con-
ditio al Sale Contracts: The Consumer and Article III of the Commercial Code, 57
YALE L.J. 1414, 1417 (1948). Cf. Britton, Assignment of Mortgages Securing Negoti-
able Notes, 10 ILL. L. REv. 337, 354-55 (1915). But see Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 8, 53-55
(1955), for a discussion of illustrative cases giving the protection of a holder in due
course to a transferee of a conditional sale securing a negotiable note when the transferee
was in fact a holder in due course of the note. An example is Thal v. Credit Alliance
Corp., 78 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 598 (1935), explicitly apply-
ing Carpenter v. Longan to immunize the transferee of a conditional sale contract from
the buyer's defenses.
27. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271 (1872).
28. See 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 321 (1943); 2 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND
CONDITIONAL SALES § 503 (Bowers ed. 1933) ; OSBORNE, Op. Cit. supra note 24, at § 231.
29. Strictly speaking, it is negotiation, rather than assignment, which constitutes
the transferee of a negotiable instrument the holder thereof. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 30; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-202(1). See, Britton, Transfers and Are-
gotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and Article 3 of the Uniform Con-
inercial Code, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 153, 157-59 (1953). However, the Carpenter case ante-
dated the N.I.L., and, besides, negotiation of a note is often loosely spoken of as an as-
signment thereof.
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should pay it at maturity to any bona fide indorsee, without
reference to any defenses to which it might have been liable in
the hands of the payee. The mortgage was conditioned to se-
cure the fulfillment of that contract. To let in such defence
against such a holder would be a clear departure from the agree-
ment of the mortgagor and mortgagee, to which the assignee
subsequently, in good faith, became a party. If the mortgagor
desired to reserve such an advantage, he should have given
a non-negotiable instrument.
The transfer of the note carries with it the security, with-
out any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the
latter ...
All the authorities agree that the debt is the principal thing
and the mortgage an accessory. . . There is no analogy
between this case and one where a chose in action standing alone
is sought to be enforced. . . The mortgage can have no sepa-
rate existence. When the note is paid the mortgage expires.
It cannot survive for a moment the debt which the note repre-
sents. This dependent and incidental relation is the controlling
consideration, and takes the case out of the rule applied to
choses in action, where no such relation of dependence exists.
Accessorium non ducit, sequitur principale.3 °
Notwithstanding the foregoing statements of the Court as to the
effect on a mortgage of its having been given to secure a negotiable note,
it would not be fair to credit the Carpenter case with the suggestion that
the doctrine of imputed negotiability is the exclusive rule by which ques-
tions involving the enforceability of a security interest for a negotiable
note are to be resolved. On the contrary, the opinion in Carpenter inti-
mated that the protection it extended the assignee was supportable on an-
other ground, by accepting the language of a Maine case3' that "the as-
signee of a mortgage is on the same footing with the bona fide mort-
gagee. In all cases the reliance of the purchaser is upon the record, and
when that discloses an unimpeachable title he receives the protection of
the law as against unknown and latent defects."32  The defense of the
maker being one fully assertable against an assignee for present value
without regard to his good faith, the Court's reference to reliance upon
30. 83 U.S. at 273-76.
31. Pierce v. Faunce, 47 Me. 507 (1859).
32. 83 U.S. at 276.
33. On the hypothesis that the doctrine of imputed negotiability was not applicable,
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the record, and its effort to analogize the assignee's position to that of a
bona fide purchaser has complicated understanding of the proper role of
the doctrine of imputed negotiability. This is a point to be borne in mind
in the consideration of cases that have put exclusive reliance on Car-
penter's enunciation of the doctrine to explain the enforceability of a se-
curity interest.
The doctrine of Carpenter v. Longan has been the subject of well-
considered criticism."4 While nearly all the serious commentary on this
doctrine was written before World War II," resurrection of the contro-
versy over its merits is beyond the intentions of this paper. This paper
is confined to an inquiry into the vitality of the doctrine in litigation
attacking unperfected security interests in bankruptcy.
A. Immunization Against the Trustee's Attack. Read in the con-
text of its factual situation, the opinion in Carpenter v. Longan can be
understood as holding only that the bonafide purchaser of a mortgage
securing a negotiable note is protected from "patent" equities,"6 i.e., equi-
ties between the original parties to the security agreement. The Court's
language, founding the concept of imputed negotiability on the "de-
pendent and incidental relation" between the note and its mortgage se-
curity, has, however, encouraged the inference that third parties' equities
are as well cut off by the presence of a negotiable note. Strangely
enough, the cases in which the doctrine has played a prominent role in
the protection from "latent" equitie' appear to take what is actually a
tortuous way out, since the assignee of a mortgage, even when given to
the court should have subjected the assignee, regardless of his good faith, to the maker's
defense of payment or equitable satisfaction. See OSBORNE, op. cit. mipra note 24, at §
227.
34. See Britton, Assignment of Mortgages Securing Negotiable Notes, 10 ILL. L.
REV. 337 (1915); Note, The Negotiable Character of Mortgages, 2 CENT. L.J. 501
(1875) ; Note, 32 ILL. L. REv. 120 (1937). For a discussion of the problems presented
by nonacceptance of the doctrine, see Ross, The Double Hazard of a Note and Mortgage,
16 MINN. L. Rav. 123 (1932).
35. After World War II, some passing comment has been made on the doctrine.
See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1083-84 (1954); Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: 1, 57 YAiu L.J. 517, 540-41
(1948) ; Note, Transfer of the Mortgagee's Interest in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. Rv. 98
(1961). A pre-war survey of cases applying the doctrine is made in Annot., 127 A.L.R.
190 (1940).
36. "Patent" equities are those in favor of parties in the assignee's chain of title.
See OSBORne, MORTGAGES 623 n.98 (1951).
37. "Latent" equities are those in third parties or "those outside of the original
debtor and the subsequent transferees in the line of ownership of the chose in action."
Ibid. A distinction is drawn between latent equities in the property and latent equities in
the obligation. See generally id. at §§ 229-30. Such a distinction, it has been thought,
is academic for purposes of considering the imputed negotiability doctrine because "the
chances of the holder ascertaining the equities are about the same in either case." Note,
Negotiability of Mortgages Given to Secure Negotiable Instruments-Ohio Theories, 8
U. CiNc. L. REV. 328, 330 (1934).
THE IMPUTED NEGOTIABILITY
secure a non-negotiable note, is generally protected from latent equities.88
Be that as it may, indiscriminate use of the doctrine to create an im-
munization for a security interest against latent equities or third-party
claims may lead to unwarranted consequences. In this connection, it is
pertinent to observe that the equities to be asserted by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy in attacking a security interest for lack of perfection are in the
nature of latent equities since they are equities belonging to creditors of
the bankrupt. 9
First Nat'l Bank v. Brotherto, 4" arising in a jurisdiction which had
originally subjected a holder in due course to the debtor's equities,4 in-
volved an attack by the trustee against a security interest on the ground
that it was in fraud of the bankrupt's creditors. There, a lumber cor-
poration, while insolvent, bought back its own shares from a stock-
holder. In payment for these shares, the corporation executed a promis-
sory note secured by a real estate mortgage. The payee-stockholder
transferred the note and mortgage to a bank, which took as a bona fide
holder for value. Upon the lumber corporation's adjudication in bank-
ruptcy, its trustee sued to have the mortgage cancelled as a fraud on the
company's creditors. The lower court gave judgment for the trustee,
but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed. Acknowledging the fraudulent
nature of the mortgage in that "the mere surrender by [the stockholder]
of his stock in an insolvent corporation did not constitute a sufficient
consideration to sustain . . . [the] mortgage to [the stockholder],' '42
the court stated the question it had to resolve thus: "May the invalidity
of the mortgage be asserted against the bank which received it with the
note which it secured, before due, for a full consideration contemporane-
ously advanced by it, and without either actual or constructive notice of
the circumstances attending the execution of . . . the mortgage?"4 The
court identified the right being asserted against the bank as "a latent
equity in favor of persons who are not parties to the mortgage and as to
whom the record contains no disclosure whatever."
44
[C]ases of this character are determined by the familiar rule
that a mortgage is an incident to a negotiable note which it se-
cures, and is subject to no equity which may not be asserted
against the holder of the note. If it should be conceded that
38. See OSBORNi, op. cit. supra note 36, at §§ 229-30.
39. See, e.g., Hannekin v. Sheaf f, 226 Ill. App. 368, 372 (1922).
40. 78 Ohio St. 162, 84 N.E. 794 (1908).
41. See Note, supra note 37, at 331.
42. 78 Ohio St. at 171, 84 N.E. at 796.
43. Ibid.
44. 78 Ohio St. at 172, 84 N.E. at 797.
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one in the position of the plaintiff in error [the bank] might,
consistently with the principles of law, be required to ascertain,
before purchasing, whether the mortgagor has a defense against
a suit to foreclose his equity of redemption, it would not follow
that he should be held to inquire of mankind with respect to
latent equities."
Not content to rely on the doctrine of imputed negotiability, the Ohio
court found support for its decision in a policy against having persons
acquiring secured paper "inquire of mankind with respect to latent
equities."
A third variation on the theme of these cases is afforded by Myers
v. Hazzard,46 where the protection extended the transferee of a fraudu-
lent mortgage to secure a promissory note was explained on a combina-
tion of the imputed negotiability doctrine with the analogy of the holder's
position to that of a bona fide purchaser, as in Carpenter v. Longan.7 In
rationalizing its extension of the Carpenter rule to the area of latent
equities, Myers made a careful assessment of the impact of Carpenter on
the entire question of whether a security interest given for a negotiable
note should be immunized from all kinds of equities. In Myers, the
bankrupt, George Hazzard, fraudulently executed certain negotiable
promissory notes, with a mortgage on a herd of cattle to secure them, to
John Hazzard. John Hazzard sold the notes and mortgage to Coates,
who took before maturity and without notice of the fraud. George Haz-
zard's assignee in bankruptcy sued to set aside the promissory note and
the mortgage as fraudulent. The district court ruled in favor of Coates
in an elaborate opinion.
The court recognized the question before it to be whether Coates,
admittedly a bona fide purchaser of commercial paper secured by mort-
gage, "is to be regarded in the light also of an innocent bona fide pur-
chaser of the mortgage, so as to have the right to enforce it as against
the assignee in bankruptcy of George Hazzard." 9  The court then ana-
45. 78 Ohio St at 172-73, 84 N.E. at 797.
46. 50 Fed. 155 (D. Neb. 1881).
47. For a case which extended protection to an assignee of a fraudulent mortgage
securing a negotiable note exclusively on the basis that he was a bona fide purchaser,
see Holmes v. Gardner, 50 Ohio St. 167, 33 N.E. 644 (1893). On the same reasoning,
the assignee of a real estate mortgage given to secure a note prevailed over a prior un-
recorded mortgage on the same collateral in Leeper v. Hunkin, 22 Ohio App. 204, 153
N.E. 519 (1926), noted in 22 ILL. L. REv. 214 (1927).
48. The assignee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, as under the
Bankruptcy Acts of 1800 and 1841, was the precursor of the trustee in bankruptcy under
the present Act. It was not however until 1910 that the trustee was vested with the
rights of a hypothetical lien creditor. 4 COLLIER 943 n.32 (1959).,
49. 50 Fed. at 156.
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lyzed the value of the Carpenter case as a precedent in the resolution of
the issue so stated in the following terms:
This case [i.e., Carpenter v. Longan] is not, . .. , as some law-
yers have assumed, authority for the doctrine that the bona fide
purchaser, without notice, of a negotiable underdue note, se-
cured by mortgage, holds the mortgage precisely as he holds the
note, subject to no defenses whatever that would not be good
against the latter. In that case there was no question as to the
title of the mortgagor at the time that the mortgage was given,
nor as to the rights of any third party with respect to the mort-
gaged property, nor as to the validity or construction of the
mortgage itself. It seems manifest that it was not the inten-
tion of the court to assert broadly the rule that, because a mort-
gage is given to secure a negotiable note, which, before matur-
ity, is assigned to a bona fide purchaser, therefore no objection
can be raised to the mortgage, unless it would be an objection
constituting a defense to the note in the hands of such a pur-
chaser. The court decided the case before it, and was careful
to qualify its opinion by the words "under the circumstances
of this case."" °
Whereupon the court proceeded to explain the "true meaning and .
proper limitations" of the imputed negotiability doctrine of Carpenter v.
Longan:
Although the general language employed in some of the cases
might seem to justify the inference that a mortgage transferred
with a negotiable note before due is to be treated for all pur-
poses as commercial paper, it is manifest that the rule thus
broadly stated cannot be maintained upon principle. In many
of the cases the rule is stated to be that the mortgage is re-
garded as following the note, and as taking the same character;
but it must, of course, be understood that the mortgage takes
the character of a negotiable note only in so far as in its nature
it is capable of having that character imputed to it, and there-
fore the rule must be subject to certain modifications or ex-
ceptions. In any suit brought by the assignee of the note to
foreclose the mortgage, the mortgagor may be heard to assert
that the mortgage is invalid as to all or part of the property,
by reason of anything that appears upon the face of the mort-
50. Id. at 158.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
gage, or by reason of anything that the assignee is bound to
know, whether the same constitutes a defense to the note or not.
A third party may be heard to assert, as against the validity of
such a mortgage in the hands of the assignee, that the mort-
gagor, at the time of the execution of the mortgage, had no
power to execute it. . . [T]here may, beyond question, be
defenses to a mortgage in such a case that cannot be defenses
to the note,--defenses the force and effect of which cannot be
determined by an appeal to the principles of the law merchant.
Of this character are objections which relate to, and in the na-
ture of the case can only relate to, the mortgage, its construc-
tion, validity, or force and effect. They may be objections
which only third parties are interested in raising. We cannot
give to the mortgage all the properties of negotiable paper, nor
apply to it all the principles of the law merchant, without a dis-
regard of elementary principles.5 '
Implying that the doctrine of imputed negotiability has been manipu-
lated to justify what struck the court as an "attempt to treat a mortgage
for all purposes as commercial paper,"52 the court pointed out how a
mortgage may be immunized against latent equities in the hands of an
assignee even though the security instrument cannot be regarded as
wholly negotiable:
If a negotiable promissory note, secured by mortgage upon per-
sonal property, be assigned for value, before maturity, to a
purchaser without notice, to what extent is such purchaser
bound to inquire as to the title of the mortgagor to the mort-
gaged property? As, for example, suppose the case of an in-
solvent, who, in contemplation of bankruptcy, fraudulently
transfers his personal property to another to keep it from com-
ing into the hands of his assignee in bankruptcy, and thereafter
goes into bankruptcy; in such a case, it is, of course, clear that
the assignee could recover the property from the fraudulent
vendee; but if he has mortgaged it to secure a negotiable note,
which is transferred before due to an innocent purchaser for
value, will the latter be protected as against the claims of the
assignee? Each case involving claims of this character must
be determined upon the rule . . . that the assignee of the note
is to be regarded as a purchaser of the mortgaged property from
51. Id. at 159.
52. Id. at 160.
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the mortgagor, and to be protected to the extent that any other
purchaser would be protected, and to that extent only. The
purchaser of personal property from a fraudulent vendee, in
good faith and without notice of the fruad, is unaffected by
the equities of third parties of which he has no notice...
Applying this rule to the case of the assignee of a negotiable
note, secured by mortgage upon personal property, under such
circumstances as to make him the purchaser of the property,
we reach the conclusion that in such a case as that last stated
he is entitled to protection."3
It is, however, not clear whether the court regarded his standing as
a bona fide purchaser an alternative basis for its decision to free Coates
of the bankruptcy assignee's claim or as an argument in addition to that
derived from the doctrine of imputed negotiability. 4 The two grounds
are distinct, and differences in result may depend on which ground is
relied on in a particular case. The bona fide purchaser approach reckons
with the interrelation between the instruments embodying the obligation
and the security only insofar as it accepts that the negotiation of the note
constitutes a means of transferring the security; under the imputed
negotiability view, the security's having "wandered in company with
negotiable paper""5 is what is precisely determinative of its ability to
elude latent equities. Since a holder in due course is not necessarily a
bona fide purchaser and vice versa, the true rationale of this and other
decisions under consideration deserves close scrutiny.
The imputed negotiability doctrine has also been taken into account
by courts when considering the voidability of a preferential security in-
terest which has come into the hands of a holder in due course of a
negotiable note secured thereby. Thus, in Peninsula Bank v. Wolcott,"
the preferential security for negotiable notes was upheld against attack
53. Id. at 162-63.
54. The uncertainty in this regard is not dispelled by the court's summarization of
its "conclusions in this case": (1) Coates, as the bona fide purchaser of the notes before
maturity and without notice, "took the mortgage, as he did the notes, freed from
equities arising between the previous parties thereto, and also freed from any latent
equity existing in complainant [the assignee in bankruptcy] at the time of the assign-
ment of the notes of which he, said Coates, had no notice," Carpenter being cited for
this proposition. (2) Coates, as the assignee of the notes and mortgage, under the cir-
cumstances, "is entitled to the same protection that would be accorded to the purchaser
of property from a fraudulent vendee, in good faith and without notice of the fraud.
Such a purchaser would be unaffected by latent equities of third parties of which he
had no notice." Id. at 163-64.
55. Note, The Negotiable Character of Mortgages, 2 CENT. L.J. 501, 503 (1875).
56. 232 Fed. 68 (4th Cir. 1916). This case was cited with approval in Matter of
Lynch, 8 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s.) 858, 862-63 (Ref. N.D.W. Va. 1926).
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squarely upon the reasoning that the transferee took the security as he
took the notes. The debtor in the case had executed negotiable notes se-
cured by a deed of trust on a tract of land. The security was preferential
in the hands of the first holder, but two of the notes were discounted by
a bank in the usual course of its business. The maker was adjudicated
bankrupt, and his creditors sought to set aside the deed of trust. Hold-
ing the deed of trust to be a valid security for the notes held by the bank,
the court reasoned:
This indorsement [of the notes to the bank] carried with it the
security of the deed of trust. The authorities at one time were
in serious conflict on the question whether the indorsee of a
negotiable note took the mortgage given to secure it subject to
defenses which might have been set up against the original
mortgagee; but it is now well settled by the great weight of
authority that the indorsee of a negotiable note takes the mort-
gage given to secure it, if valid on its face, as he takes the note,
freed from defenses which might have availed against the
original mortgagee. Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271. .... "
In another case5" involving substantially the same set of facts, the
court protected the transferee of chattel mortgages voidable as prefer-
ences in the hands of the mortgagee, not on a reasoning based upon the
doctrine of imputed negotiability 9 but, rather, on the rule that the trus-
tee cannot recover preferentially transferred property from an innocent
purchaser for value." The principle of this case was codified by a 1938
amendment to section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act."' By this section, as
thus amended, the trustee is explicitly barred from recovering preferen-
tially transferred property from "a bona-fide purchaser from or lienor
of the debtor's transferee for a present fair equivalent value."
The qualification in section 60b that to be protected, the bona fide
purchaser must have given present value, is significant. It is a qualifi-
cation that dovetails with the generally understood conception of a bona
fide purchaser in property law as one who has given present valueY
57. 232 Fed. at 70-71.
58. It re Ballard, 279 Fed. 574 (N.D. Tex. 1922). This case was cited in Matter
of Lynch, supra note 56, at 863, to support the proposition that "in the event a mortgage
or deed of trust creates a preference as against the mortgagee, still the mortgage will
be good as to the security of the notes in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value."
59. Notwithstanding the mortgages were transferred with the negotiable notes they
secured.
60. 279 Fed. at 591-92.
61. See 3 COLLIER 776, 1024-25 (1950).
62. See 1 PATTON, TITLES § 13 (2d ed. 1957).
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Now, when it is remembered that in the law of negotiable paper, ante-
cedent value or a pre-existing debt is sufficient to constitute one a holder
of an instrument for value' and thus possibly a holder in due course,
the occasion for a conflict with section 60b becomes manifest. Such an
occasion presented itself in Bennett v. Semmes,64 a case which arose prior
to the 1938 amendment of section 60b, but whether the court in this case
recognized a conflict between the view that the transferees of the prefer-
ential grantee were bona fide purchasers and the view that they were hold-
ers in due course, is not clear." In this case, the bankrupt executed a deed
of trust in the nature of a mortgage to secure negotiable promissory
notes given to R. R delivered these notes to three banks to secure the
renewal of R's notes to these banks. The court found that the notes and
deed of trust were preferential in the hands of R. The issue presented
for resolution was whether the banks, as "the holders of the notes se-
cured by the mortgage, are entitled to the relief they ask, that the mort-
gage be decreed to be valid, as to the notes held by them, entitling them
to the benefit of the lien thereof, and that they have leave to file their
independent suit to foreclose it."66  After stating that the first question
it had to answer was whether the banks were holders in due course of the
notes, the court concluded that they were such holders on the reasoning
that section 25 of the Uniform Negotiable Investments Law defined
"value" to include an antecedent or pre-existing debt. Proceeding then
to a consideration of the "only remaining question," that of the enforce-
ability of the mortgage, the court rendered the following construction of
section 60 as it then read:
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act . . . as amended by the act
of 1910, after declaring what preferences are voidable, pro-
vides that the trustee is entitled to "recover the property (re-
ferring to the property conveyed in violation of that section),
or its value from such person."
Upon facts practically identical with those in the case at
bar, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in Davis v. Hanover Savings Fund Society, 210 Fed.
768, 771, 127 C.C.A. 318, held that the holder for value, in
due course, of bonds secured by a mortgage on the bankrupt's
63. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 25; UNIFOR1, COMmERCiAL CODE § 3-303(b).
64. 287 Fed. 745 (E.D. Ark. 1923).
65. Criticism of the Bennett case has been made, however, on the assumption that
there was such conflict and that the court resolved the conflict in favor of the holder
in due course view. See Note, Bankruptcy and Negotiable Instruments, 64 HARV. L. REv.
958, 960-61 (1951).
66. 287 Fed. at 747.
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property, which was an unlawful preference, when assigned as
collateral security for an existing indebtedness, is entitled to the
the lien of the mortgage. Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act
: * * which applies to fraudulent conveyances by a bankrupt, is
in most respects similar to section 60, and has been uniformly
construed by the federal as well as state courts, that a trustee
in bankruptcy cannot recover property, fraudulently conveyed
by a bankrupt to one who had knowledge of the fraudulent in-
tent of the bankrupt, from one who became the owner thereof
in due course, in good faith, and for value, without notice of
the fraud ...
It is true that section 70e expressly excepts "a bona fide
holder for value," but the same rule must be applied to pref-
erences under section 60 for a number of reasons.
(a) A recovery under section 60 is'limited "to such persons,"
clearly referring to the person who received the unlawful prefer-
ence. A careful reading of the entire section can lead to no
other conclusion.
(b) A trustee in bankruptcy occupies no better position than
the bankrupt, or creditors of the bankrupt, if bankruptcy had
not intervened, except as expressly excepted by the Bankruptcy
Act ...
(c) Section 60 declares such preferences only voidable, and
not void. A voidable transfer is good, even in the hands of the
unlawfully preferred creditor, until set aside, or proceedings to
set the preference aside are instituted; but an assignment or
transfer from the preferred grantee to one who is a bona fide
purchaser or holder for value in due course, without notice of
the fraud in the original transaction, is good, and such an as-
signee or transferee cannot be deprived of it, or be held liable
for its value, in an action by the trustee of the bankrupt estate.
This applies with greater force to negotiable instruments. To
hold otherwise would necessitate a purchaser of every negoti-
able instrument making inquiries, which the law does not re-
quire.
To place this construction on the act would greatly inter-
fere with, if not wholly destroy, the negotiability of such in-
struments in the financial world.67
67. Id. at 749-50.
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Judgment was given for the banks who were held to be entitled to the
lien of the trust deed, but without prejudice to any action which the trus-
tee might elect to institute against R for the value of the preference.
The opinion makes no mention of the doctrine of imputed negoti-
ability. It escapes understanding, however, why the court thought that
the question of whether the banks were holders in due course to be rele-
vant, or that it was the first question to be resolved, since the court itself
realized that what it was confronted with was the issue as to the en-
forceability of the mortagage as security for the notes held by the bank.
The holding-in-due-course question would appear to be relevant only had
the court been invoking the doctrine of imputed negotiability to explain
the enforceability of the mortgage notwithstanding its preferential
character in the hands of R, or if there were involved some claim or
defense to the notes themselves. The implication that the banks were
bona fide purchasers overlooks the fact that the bankrupt's notes were
given to the banks to secure renewal notes and, therefore, pre-existing
indebtedness.68  Whatever the rationale of the court's holding-whether
an inarticulate application of the doctrine of imputed negotiability or an
incorrect application of the bona fide purchaser exception read by the
courts into section 60b prior to its 1938 amendment, the Semmes case
seems unsound and clearly incompatible with the "present fair equivalent
value" requirement of the saving clause in section 60b.
B. Immunization Against Other Third-Party Claims. The impact
of the doctrine of imputed negotiability on the bankruptcy trustee's posi-
tion vis-a-vis an unperfected security interest may also be gathered from
a consideration of decisions that have used the doctrine to create an im-
munity from claims conceptually analogous to those assertable by the
trustee against an unperfected security interest.
Consider, for instance, the case of Stock Growers' Fin. Corp. v.
Hildreth,9 which involved the assertion of creditors' equities by a state
court receiver appointed for a mortgagor. The debtor had executed a
promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage which the payee indorsed
for value to a finance company. In a suit by the indorsee to foreclose
the mortgage, the state court receiver's defense was that the mortgage
was void as against the mortgagor's creditors for noncompliance with a
6S. The great weight of state decisions indicates that, in such case, the transferee
of the notes is not a purchaser for value unless he gave a promise of extension or other
present consideration. See 4 COLLIER 1762 (1959). By its reference to the Negotiable
Instruments Law's definition of "value" to include a pre-existing indebtedness, the court
in the case under discussion in the text was apparently conceding that the banks gave
no present consideration for the notes.
69. 30 Ariz. 505, 249 Pac. 71 (1926).
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state statute requiring the chattel mortgagee to sign an affidavit of bona
fides.7 Finding the finance company to be a holder in due course of the
note, the court gave judgment in its favor upon an unmistakable applica-
tion of the doctrine of imputed negotiability:
It is settled in this jurisdiction, and in most of the other juris-
dictions where the question has arisen, that a purchaser in due
course of negotiable paper takes it and any mortgage given to
secure its payment free from equitable defenses between the
parties thereto, as well as secret or latent defects in the mort-
gage. The same immunity from defenses is extended to the
mortgage as to the note.7'
Immunity from a variety of other third-party claims has been held
to derive from the negotiable note for which the security was given.
Thus, the court in one case' relied on such reasoning in allowing the in-
dorsee of a secured note to have priority over a prior unrecorded mort-
gage of which the indorser had notice. In another case,7" the court freed
the indorsee from a third party's claim against the property given as col-
lateral for the note, resting explicitly on the proposition that "where the
security passes to the holder of a negotiable promissory note, nothing is
a defense to the security which would not in law be a defense to the
note."74  "Although," the court added, "the security may be mentioned
in the note, that does not make it necessary for the purchaser to examine
into the history of the security."7  The opinions in both these cases dis-
closed an awareness of at least one other rationale for reaching the same
result. In the first case, the court also referred to the security holder's
position as that of a bona fide purchaser;7 1 in the second, the contract on
which the third party was basing his claim was void but the court men-
tioned this circumstance only by way of buttressing its conclusion that
the filing of the contract did not give rise to constructive notice to the
indorsee so as to impair his holder-in-due-course statusY.7  The security's
70. The statute required the affidavit to be attached to the mortgage. ARIz. CnvM
CoDE oF 1913 ff 4124. No such affidavit of bona fides is required under the UNIFORM
COMMERcIAL CODE § 9-203.
71. 30 Ariz. at 514, 249 Pac. at 74. Sed quacre, whether the mortgage, though de-
fectively executed, could be treated as an equitable mortgage and held assignable as such.
See Karesh, Security Transactions, 10 S.C.L.Q. 114, 118-20 (1957).
72. Gould v. Marsh, 1 Hun 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874). Compare Elias Brewing Co.
v. Boeger, 132 N.Y. Supp. 286 (1911); and see 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES 1353 n.21 (1943).
Cf. Leeper v. Hunkin, supra note 47.
73. W. W. Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133, 48 N.W. 1100 (1891).
74. 80 Wis. at 143, 48 N.W. at 1103.
75. Ibid.
76. 1 Hun at 569.
77. 80 Wis. at 143-44, 48 N.W. at 1103-04.
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imputed negotiable character has also been relied on to sustain the claim
of a holder in due course of a secured note to ownership of the mortgage
securing it notwithstanding recordation of a prior assignment of the same
mortgage by the mortgagee to another holder."8
However extensive the protection against third-party claims the
cases have sometimes accorded to the security holder who is also a holder
in due course of the obligation secured, this protection is not unqualified
in any jurisdiction."9 No case goes so far as to enforce the security in
disregard of prior recorded liens of which the holder in due course may
not, technically, be on constructive notice."0 And there has been firm
resistance to the use of the note as a shield against, for instance, the
rights of beneficiaries of homestead legislation.8' Indeed, in a jurisdic-
78. See Foster v. Augustana College & Theological Seminary, 92 Okla. 96, 218
Pac. 335 (1923), noted in 8 MINN. L. REv. 337, 347 (1924) and 37 A.L.R. 854 (1925).
Contra, e.g., Murphy v. Barnard, 162 Mass. 72, 38 N.E. 29 (1894).
79. Cf. Silverman v. Bullock, 98 Ill. 11 (1881).
80. See Orrick v. Durham, 79 Mo. 174 (1883) ; Logan v. Smith, 62 Mo. 455, 459-60
(1876) (dictum). Cf. Lewis v. Kirk, 28 Kan. 497 (1882) (dictum) (purchaser of mort-
gaged property will prevail over holder in due course of note secured by unrecorded
mortgage). But cf. Gould v. Marsh, supra note 72. Sed quaere: Should distinction be
made between a case where the record shows a prior lien and a case where the record
shows that the debtor is not the owner of, or has no title to, the collateral? See notes
78 and 79 supra and accompanying text.
81. Berry v. Berry, 57 Kan. 691, 47 Pac. 837 (1897), in allowing the defense of
the wife-mortgagor (that she signed the mortgage on her homestead under duress) to
bar foreclosure by a holder in due course of the secured note, put the case against an
undue extension of the imputed negotiability doctrine quite strongly:
[I]n this state, if the wife or husband does not give consent, or join in the
execution, the instrument [mortgaging a homestead] does not rise to the rank
of a mortgage. It is absolutely void, and not even binding upon the one who
does consent. Would it be contended that a mortgage to which the wife's sig-
nature was forged, or which had never been signed by her, would follow the
note and be enforceable as a security? It is unlike a case where joint consent
was actually given though obtained by fraud; while here, where the consent of
the wife is lacking, there is no mortgage. It would be carrying the doctrine of
negotiability beyond reason, to make a mortgage which is against the statute
and prohibited by the Constitution, binding and enforceable, merely because it
accompanied and purported to secure a negotiable promissory note. It is not
negotiable in form, and of itself has no negotiable qualities; but a rule has
been established by the courts, that because of its relation to negotiable paper
it is invested with negotiable character. A rule so made, applying to mort-
gages the principles which pertain to negotiable paper, cannot prevail over the
specific provisions of the Constitution and statute. The Constitution provides
that a homestead 'shall not be alienated without the joint consent of husband
and wife, when that relation exists. . . .' The same prohibition is repeated
by the Legislature in one of the statutes. . . . These positive and solemn
declarations cannot be overcome by a mere rule of commercial law or by any
judicial dogma.
57 Kan. at 694-95, 47 Pac. at 838. But cf. Patrick v. Kilgore, 238 Ala. 604, 193 So. 112
(1940).
For a perceptive discussion, with stress on the Texas cases in point, of the avail-
ability of the defense of homestead as against a holder in due course seeking to enforce
his security interest in a homestead, see Note, 16 TEXAs L. Rxv. 534 (1938). This note
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tion which has been markedly partial to assignees of security interests as
against latent equities regardless of whether the security is associated
with a negotiable note, the equity of a cestui que trust has been preserved
against the security in the hands of a holder in due course of the secured
note.
82
III. THE NEGOTIABLE NOTE AS A SHIELD FOR AN UNPERFECTED
SECURITY INTEREST IN BANKRUPTCY
To the trustee in bankruptcy, the courts' handling of the notion of
imputed negotiability presents nettlesome possibilities. The suggestion
that the validity of a security interest as against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy is to be governed by the law of negotiable paper forebodes con-
flict with the federal policy against enforcement of unperfected security
interests in bankruptcy. The trustee can derive little assurance from
the decisions discussed in the preceding part, which have excepted certain
third-party claims from the compass of the security's imputed immun-
ity.83 These holdings shrink from rejecting the doctrine of imputed
negotiability but attempt to qualify it. When an explanation is ventured,
the qualification is grounded on some policy consideration thought to
supervene any argument for extending the principles of negotiable paper.
Thus, the homestead cases point to a state constitutional or statutory
provision restricting the transfer of property.84 Where the right of a
holder in due course to enforce his security interest has been subordin-
ated to the right of a cestui que trust, recordation of the deed of trust
has been taken to impart notice of the cestui's rights."3 The tacit premise
of such a holding seems to be that the registry laws' supremacy is not to
be surrendered in matters relating to the transfer or creation of interests
in property.
In making unperfected security interests voidable in bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Act generally defers to state law for the test of perfection.
Thus, under section 70c, state law decides under what circumstances a
creditor can "obtain a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date
of bankruptcy" on the property of the bankrupt and what rights are
argues for the view that a holder in due course of a promissory note secured by a void
mortgage on a homestead may well be entitled to foreclosure, not because of his status
as such a holder but on estoppel or some like ground. In such a case, the author urges,
"the defense is not a defense against personal liability on the note but a defense against
the mnortgage alone, arising out of rules of property law relating only to the security."
Id. at 536. See Notes, 8 TEXAs L. Rlv. 430, 593 (1930).
82. See Note, 32 ILL. L. Rlv. 120 (1937).
83. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 81 supra.
85. See Note, 32 ILL. L. Rav. 120, 123 (1937).
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acquired by such a lien creditor.8" Should the state law therefore apply
the doctrine of imputed negotiability against creditors of the debtor so as
to validate a security interest in the hands of a holder in due course
whether the interest is perfected or not, the trustee would be likewise
barred from avoiding the security interest for the estate. This result is
expressly contemplated by section 70e's saving caluse"
The cases in which the doctrine of imputed negotiability has been
invoked to prevent the trustee from recovering fraudulently or prefer-
entially transferred property suggest further potentialities for the doc-
trine as a means of limiting the reach of the strong arm of the trustee in
bankruptcy. To push the doctrine of imputed negotiability to the point
of using it to justify enforcement in bankruptcy of an unperfected secur-
ity interest is, nevertheless, insupportable. The doctrine itself suffers, as
the Myers case has suggested, from the fallacy of equating the security
agreement with the negotiable note."8 The doctrine's inarticulate assump-
tion appears to be that the security and the note share a common suscep-
tibility to the same defenses--i.e., that all defenses to the one are also de-
fenses to the other and that there can be no defense against one which is
not also a defense against the other. That the assumption has a limited
validity is demonstrated by reference to the creditors' rights that arise
under the rules for the perfection of security interests in property. These
perfection rules, which generally take the form of a requirement for
publicity which may be satisfied by recording or filing certain documents
or by delivery of collateral to the secured party, have no counterpart in
the law of negotiable paper.8" There are accordingly no equities of credi-
tors involved in the execution or negotiation of this paper comparable to
those involved in the creation of security interests in property. The en-
forcement of a negotiable obligation against the primarily liable party
need not interfere with or militate against the enforcement of third
parties' rights against the same debtor, but the enforcement of a security
agreement is necessarily either subject to or in derogation of other
parties' security interests in the same collateral. A bona fide purchaser
may cut off the latent equities of third persons in property purchased but
86. 4 COLLIER 1 70.49 (1959).
87. An application of the doctrine of imputed negotiability would make of the
transferee of a security interest given for a negotiable note "a person as to whom the
transfer or obligation . . . is valid under applicable . . . State laws."
88. The doctrine, it has been observed, would "treat the mortgage securing the
negotiable note not merely as an incident of it but as having actually no existence."
OSnORNE, MORTGAGES 635 n.66 (1951). See also note 81 supra.
89. The rules for perfecting security interests in negotiable instruments themselves
are, of course, properly part of the law on secured transactions and not of the law of
negotiable paper. See U.IFORU COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-304.
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he cannot take free of the patent equities discoverable by consulting the
people and the records which are accessible to him in the eyes of the law.
If he is taking as a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument, the
law puts such a premium on the freedom of the commerce in such an in-
strument from restraints that the holder is relieved from worry about
many of the defenses that could have been discovered by diligent in-
quiry. The policy favoring the imputation of negotiability to the secur-
ity accompanying a negotiable instrument is extended beyond its legiti-
mate bounds when it is invoked to protect one taking the security for or
an account of an antecedent debt as against other creditors who would
be able to defeat the security interest but for the circumstance of its con-
nection with a negotiable note in the hands of a holder in due course.
The status of a holder in due course is peculiar to the law of negoti-
able paper. Notwithstanding any historical affinity the concept of holder
in due course may have with that of a bona fide purchaser in sales or
property law,9" there is no holder in due course of a security instrument
in our law,9 even though the courts that have elaborated the imputed
negotiability doctrine infer the existence of such a person."  Indeed, the
manner by which the courts have been able to deduce from Carpenter v.
Longan a rule of protection against creditors' equities defies logical ex-
planation. Carpenter's rationalization upon a contract theory of its pro-
tection of the assignee of the mortgage from the mortgagor's equity is
irrelevant to the question of whether a similar protection should be given
from equities of the mortgagor's creditors. Carpenter reasoned that it
would be varying the original contract on the note to subject the assignee
to the mortgagor's equity, and that the assignee became a party to this
contract by an indorsement of the note to him.9" Granting arguendo that
such is the import of the contract on the note, still no one would think of
arguing that the mortgagor's creditors were privy to such a contract. In
90. See Beutel, Negotiability by Contract: A Problem in Statutory Interpretation,
28 ILL. L. REv. 205, 208-10 (1933).
91. Gold Bros. Security Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 47 S.D. 31, 34, 195 N.W. 830,
831 (1923) (dissenting opinion) : "there is no such thing as a holder in due course of
1 mortgage." Contra, Frystad v. Graff, 55 S.D. 523, 527, 226 N.W. 745, 746-47 (1929) :
"transfer of the note carried with it the security, and, if Graff was a holder in due
course of the note, he was a holder in due course of the security without any formal
assignment of the mortgage."
92. Cf. Comment, Extension of the Concept of Negotiability, 8 Wis. L. REv. 272,
275 (1933).
93. It has been suggested that a debtor, by executing a negotiable note and giving
security therefor, does not contract to secure the note to all subsequent indorsees as well
as to the payee. See Britton, Assignment of Mortgages Securing Ncgotiable Notes, 10
ILL. L. REv. 337, 357-58 (1915).
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any case, the creditors' equities under the perfection statutes are ob-
viously equities against the security and not against the note.
The argument sometimes advanced that to deprive the holder in due
course of the benefit of his security interest is to detract from the negoti-
ability of the secured note, 4 is easily disposed of. In the first place, de-
priving the holder in due course of the benefit of the security for the
note does not entail any limitation of his right to enforce the note as an
unsecured obligation." A negotiable instrument as such is never more
than that kind of an obligation. In the second place, such an argument
ignores the fact that when negotiable paper is issued with security, the
intention is less to have the paper freely circulate as currency than to pro-
vide a vehicle of investment.9" And, finally, even of a holder in due
course some amount of reasonable diligence, prudence, and circumspec-
tion, short of course of making inquiry of all mankind as to latent equi-
ties, is required. A note's attribute of negotiability does not imply for
the holder in due course an absolute immunity from latent equities. Thus,
if these limitations on the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable
instrument are accepted as part of its attributes of negotiability, it would
not be putting an unreasonable restriction on the free transferability of
94. Dashiell, The Negotiability of Deeds of Trust in Virginia, 3 VA. L. REv. 296,
298 (1916):
Vast sums of money are invested in negotiable notes secured by deeds
of trust on real property and the notes themselves, being continually negotiated
by outright sales or by use as collateral security for another loan, take an im-
portant place in our commercial life. To hold that the security does not share
with its notes the immunities of negotiability, would be to put an intolerable
clog on the freedom of contract, and to the disadvantage of both the borrower
and lender. The law should follow business, and the same reasons that give a
holder in due course of negotiable paper a favored place are grounds for a de-
cision holding that the security derives negotiability.
When a borrower executes negotiable notes and a deed of trust on his
property to secure them, he knows that the notes with a memorandum thereon
of their security will probably come into the hands of innocent purchasers. To
hold that after this has happened be can withdraw the security will be to in-
troduce into a transaction that should be conclusive, a lack of finality-a never
failing course of litigation.
95. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 830 (7th ed. Beutel rev. 1948).
See generally Ross, The Double Hazard of a Note and Mortgage, 16 MINN. L. REV. 123(1932).
96. At common law promissory notes were non-negotiable; and today, at least
for notes secured by mortgage, there does not exist the great mercantile neces-
sity that they be freely transferable as currency. The note secured by mortgage
is taken more as an investment than as a means of advancing short term credits
or providing the necessary currency of exchange. It would seem reasonable
therefore and not too great a burden to require the purchaser of a note secured
by mortgage to examine the record in order to protect himself.
Comment, Some Problems Concerning Negotiable Notes Secured by Mortgage or Deed
of Trust in California, 22 CALIF. L. REv. 677, 683 (1934). But see the excerpt from
Dashiell, supra note 94.
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secured notes to bind the transferee that he ascertain from the appropriate
public records the security's perfected or unperfected condition.
If by dressing the security with the note's cloth of negotiability the
rules of negotiable paper should be held to govern the enforceability of
the security as well as the note in derogation of the rules respecting the
perfection of security interests, faith in our recording and notice-filing
systems would of course be undermined. Indeed, the doctrine in its ex-
treme form suggests that the holder in due course is free not only to en-
force his security interest notwithstanding its own lack of perfection, but
also in disregard of interests that are themselves duly perfected. While
such a metamorphosis of a security agreement into a negotiable instru-
ment has not been countenanced, the holder in due course still being held
to be on constructive notice of prior perfected security interests," the
doctrine of imputed negotiability is susceptible to being logically extended
to absurd extremes.9" Hence, the desirability of a definitive and sensible
definition of the interrelation between a negotiable note and its accom-
panying security with a view to clarifying the rule as to the enforce-
ability of an unperfected security interest in bankruptcy.99
97. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 636 n.75 (1951) ; Glimore, The Commercial Doctrine
of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1066 n.23 (1954). But, of course, nothing
in the records can constitute notice as would detract from holding in due course. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-304(5); 1955 N.Y. LAW REVISION Coienx'N REP. vol. 2,
at 939. See also Britton, Holder int Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law With Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code,
49 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 432-33 (1954). For a suggestion that, if the negotiable instru-
ment is part of chattel paper, constructive notice from filing may impair the transferee's
holder in due course position, see Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Un-
der the Uniformn Commercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209, 1226 (1950).
98. See Pope v. Beauchamp, 110 Tex. 271, 219 S.W. 447 (1920), commented upon
in Note, 16 TEXAS L. REv. 534, 539-40 (1938) (notice of lis pendens held not to bar fore-
closure by holder in due course of vendor's lien note although notice filed before vendor
transferred lien note). Cf. Landauer v. Sublettt, 126 Okla. 185, 188, 259 Pac. 234, 236
(1927) ("the doctrine of constructive notice is applicable only to a person who is deal-
ing with the land itself, and since the purchaser of a negotiable promissory note, se-
cured by mortgage, is not dealing in land, there is no field for the operation of the
registry laws in cases of this kind") ; Fortson v. Bishop, 204 Ala. 524, 527, 86 So. 399,
401 (1920):
The mortgage being but an incident, attaching and attending rights created by
or resulting from the negotiable character of the . . . note, the rights of the
parties were and are determinable and measurable with reference to the negoti-
able instrument, and not with qualifying reference to the law of mortgages,
or to the effect, in other circumstances, that is consequent upon the reasonable
registration . . . of such conveyances of real estate.
99. Cognizance of the doctrine of imputed negotiability was taken by:
(1) The draftsmen of the abortive Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act. See Mac-
Chesney & Leesman, Mortgages, Foreclosures and Reorganizations, 31 ILL. L. REv. 287,
294-95 (1936).
(2) The draftsmen of the Restatement of Security. See RESTATEMENT, SECURITY
§§ 34, 35(b) (1941).
(3) In 1901, some Illinois legislators. See Note, 32 ILL. L. REv. 120, 122 n.14
(1937).
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IV. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND OUR PROBLEM
The preceding discussion of the doctrine of imputed negotiability
supports the Code sponsors' assumption that the rules on negotiable paper
and the rules on perfection of security interests in personal property...
are sufficiently interrelated that both may integrally be fitted into a codi-
fication of commercial law. Affirming this assumption, the Code, in
article 3 as well as in article 9, generally recognizes that there may be
occasions where these two sets of rules intersect. Section 3-103 (2) sub-
jects article 3's own provisions "to the provisions of the Article on . . .
Secured Transactions (Article 9)," and article 9, on the other hand, pro-
vides in section 9-309 that nothing in it limits the rights of a holder in
due course of a negotiable instrument and that such a holder takes pri-
ority over an earlier security interest though perfected. These two pro-
visions, whereby article 3 and article 9 appear to defer to each other in
a manner reminiscent of Alphonse and Gaston, concede the possibility
of argument at least that some rule in article 3 may collide with one in
article 9 and that some provision in article 9 might otherwise have the
effect of limiting the rights of a holder in due course as defined in article
3. The phraseology of section 9-309 and the official comment to section
3-103(2)1.1 tend nevertheless to convey the impression that the Code
sponsors understood this conceded possibility to be largely theoretical
except where a negotiable instrument is itself used as collateral for some
other obligation. Article 9 provides special rules for the perfection of
security interests in negotiable instruments, whether these instruments
are by themselves 0 2 or constitute part of chattel paper,' but section
9-309 establishes an exception to the general operation of these rules by
100. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code "does not concern land security
in general, although some of its provisions, such as those relating to fixtures and crops,
have an application to real estate." 1955 N.Y. LAw REvisioN Comxm'N REP. vol. 3, at
2015.
101. This comment reads in pertinent part:
Instruments which fall within the scope of this Article may also be subject to
other Articles of the Code. Many items in course of bank collection will of
course be negotiable instruments, and the same may be true of collateral pledged
as security for a debt. In such cases this Article, which is general, is, in case
of conflicting provisions, subject to the Articles which deal specifically with the
type of transaction or instrument involved: . . . Article 9 (Secured Trans-
actions). In the case of a negotiable instrument which is subject . . . to Article
9 because it is used as collateral, the provisions of this Article continue to be
applicable except insofar as there may be conflicting provisions in the . . .
Secured Transactions Article.
102. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-301 (1) (c), 9-302(1) (b), 9-304, 9-305,
9-309, 9-312(1).
103. See ibid. and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-308.
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allowing the holder in due course to prevail over the holder of an earlier
security interest (though perfected) in the negotiable instrument.
Section 3-305, in defining the rights of a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument, speaks of such a holder as taking the instrument
free from certain enumerated claims and defenses. No mention is made
in this section or in any other in the Code as to the rights of a holder in
due course with respect to any collateral which may have been given to
secure the instrument, even though the Code admits by its recognition of
chattel paper as a distinct category.. of chattel security that chattel se-
curity and negotiable notes are frequent fellow-travelers."' The Code
therefore leaves unanswered the question as to what rights a holder in
due course may have to a collateral agreement. An official comment,
however, to section 3-201..6 provides an oblique answer to this question:
"The rights of a transferee with respect to collateral for the instrument
are determined by Article 9 (Secured Transactions)." The "transferee"
referred to is of course the transferee of a negotiable instrument whether
from a holder or not.1"' For the comment to infer from this provision
of section 3-201 the proposition it makes as to the rights of the transfree
to collateral for the instrument is to assume that the transferee, who may
well be a holder in due course, can derive rights to the collateral by virtue
only of the provisions of article 9. And since article 9 recognizes no
rights in a holder in due course, as such, to collateral, the comment is
saying in effect that a holder in due course, as such, has no rights to the
collateral. (Section 9-309, it will be noted, recognizes the rights of a
holder in due course to the instrunent itself where the instrument is the
collateral, and not rights of a holder in due course to the collateral for
the negotiable instrument.) Whether this comment serves as a back-
handed rejection of the doctrine that a holder in due course takes the
collateral security as he takes the secured note since the former is merely
incident to the latter, is a question consigned to speculation.
Indeed the Code goes no farther, by way of defining generally the
relationship between a negotiable instrument and its accompanying se-
curity agreement, than to resolve the conflict under the Uniform Negoti-
able Instruments Law as to the effect of a reference in a note to an ac-
companying security agreement on the negotiability of the note.0 ' The
104. For definition of "chattel paper," see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
105(1) (b).
105. See comment 4 to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105 and comment 1 to UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-308.
106. Comment 4 to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: § 3-201.
107. Comment 1 to UwnORMi COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-201.
108. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-105(1) (c), (e) & (2) ; comments 3, 4
& 8 to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-105.
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Code also defines the effect of a separate written agreement on the rights
of a holder in due course with respect to the negotiable instrument."°9  It
may be said therefore that while the Code has sought to define what ef-
fect an accompanying security agreement may have on a secured negoti-
able instrument, it leaves largely untouched the effect of the negotiable
instrument on the security agreement.
The Code nevertheless recognizes a limited role for imputed negoti-
ability in a security agreement in section 9-206(1). Under this section,
a buyer or lessee (other than of consumer goods) "who as part of one
transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement"
is deemed to have agreed not to assert against an assignee any claim or
defense which he may have against the seller or lessor."' 0 Such a pre-
sumed agreement "is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assign-
ment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense,
except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in
due course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial
Paper (Article 3)." '  Here, the Code recognizes that a negotiable in-
strument and its accompanying security agreement may share a common
vulnerability to defenses or claims. To this extent, then, the Code may
be said to adopt the principle of Carpenter v. Longan. Section 9-206(1)
is noncommittal on the matter of latent equities because, in speaking of
enforceability over defenses not assertable against a holder in due course,
it refers to the enforceability of the presumed agreement not to assert
109. See UNIFORM COMMERCIA.L CODE § 3-119.
110. The reference to lessee and lessor conforms Code § 9-206 to the 1962 Official
Recommendations by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Amendment of the Code.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 9-206 (Supp. 1962).
111. The earlier versions of § 9-206 subjected the holder in due course of a negoti-
able instrument given in a sale of consumer goods to the buyer's defenses against the
seller. This provision was observed to conflict with § 9-309, which states that nothing
in article 9 limits the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. See
Kripke, supra note 97, at 1216 n.18. Even so, it has been suggested that § 9-309 should
prevail by virtue of § 3-103(2). See 1955 N.Y. LAW REvisION COMM'N REP. vol. 2, at
840. It has also been criticized as conflicting with § 3-119 which provides that a holder
in due course is not affected by any limitation of his rights arising out of a separate
written agreement if he had no notice of the limitation when he took the instrument.
See Memorandum of Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley on Article 3 of the Code, in 1954
N.Y. LAW REVISION ComIaI'N REP. vol. 1, at 198, 202. Replying to this criticism, Pro-
fessor Arthur E. Sutherland remarked that "9-206 poses a special exception to 3-119."
Id. at 246. The special treatment of a consumer's negotiable note has been defended as
commercially sound. See Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial
Code, 16 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 27, 46-47 (1951). The rephrasing of § 9-206 to its
present form, whereby the special treatment of consumer sales is provided for in the
prefatory clause ("Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods"), was intended to allow each state to establish
any special rules in conformity with local policy for consumer transactions. See 1956
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFOR-M[ COMMERCIAL CODE 271
(1957).
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defenses against the seller or lessor-not to the enforceability of the se-
curity agreement itself.
On the whole, therefore, it is necessary to say that the Code does
not define clearly its position on the doctrine of imputed negotiability
insofar as this doctrine has been developed to protect a security agree-
ment from creditors' or other third parties' equities. There is the im-
plication conveyed by an official comment that the Code means to estab-
lish a dichotomy between a negotiable instrument and its accompanying
security agreement so that no rights are obtained with respect to the
latter by virtue of its having been given for a negotiable instrument. Sec-
tion 9-206(1) modifies this implication by recognizing, in cases where a
security agreement and a negotiable instrument are issued in the sale of
nonconsumer goods, a union between these two agreements insofar as
vulnerability to patent equities is concerned. The doctrine, it will be
recalled, evolved and flowered under pre,-Code conditions and has been
regarded as compatible with the N.I.L."2  There being nothing in the
Code which could be said to have altered these pre-Code conditions, it
could be said that the Code leaves the doctrine intact. On the other
hand, since there is also nothing to indicate that the Code, with its elab-
orate scheme of priorities, was intended to create any kind of special
priority..3 for a security interest in the hands of a holder in due course
of the secured note, it can perhaps be fairly concluded that the scope of
the doctrine of imputed negotiability is well confined by the Code. The
latent potentiality of the doctrine for mischief gains no strength from
the Code's silence.
112. See BRmtroN, BILLS AND NOTEs 41 (2d ed. 1961).
113. Professor Gilmore might call this "the nearly invincible armor of the holder
in due course." See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
YALE L.J. 1057, 1069 (1954).
